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ABSTRACT
Subsidies for health insurance for chronically ill, high-cost individuals may increase coverage in the
broader population by improving the functioning of insurance markets.  In this paper, we assess an
historical example of a policy intervention of this sort, the extension of Medicare to the disabled, on
the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals.  We use data on insurance coverage from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from before and after the extension of Medicare to the disabled
to estimate the effect of the program on private insurance coverage rates in the broader population.
We find that the insurance coverage of individuals who had a health condition that limited their ability
to work increased significantly in states with high versus low rates of disability.  Our findings suggest
that that subsidizing individuals with high expected health costs is an effective way to increase the
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Does the removal of high-cost individuals from private insurance markets lead to 
greater coverage for individuals who are similar but not as high cost?  In theory, if 
removing high-cost individuals reduces the range of hidden information in insurance 
markets, then it will dampen insurers' incentives to protect themselves against adverse 
selection.  As incentives to protect against adverse selection decline, pooling increases, 
which benefits the high-cost individuals who remain (Newhouse, 1996).   
The answer to this question is central to current health policy debates.  Subsidies 
for insurance for the chronically ill, for example, seek to provide high-cost individuals 
with coverage at something like a community rate, but without forcing low-cost 
individuals to finance the cost through their purchase of insurance (Swartz, 2003; 
Holahan, et al., 2003).   The general equilibrium effect of these subsidies, however, 
depends on how they affect the form and extent of coverage in the broader insurance 
market.  Yet, despite this, there is little empirical evidence how such policies might 
perform. 
In this paper, we assess an historical example of a policy intervention of this sort, 
the extension of Medicare to the disabled, on the private insurance coverage of non-
disabled individuals.  In 1973, Congress extended Medicare benefits to beneficiaries of 
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program; prior to then, there was no 
uniform, comprehensive public insurance program for the disabled.  More important for 
the purposes of our study, extending Medicare to the disabled also had the effect of 
removing high-cost individuals from the broader pool of the privately insured.    4
No empirical evidence exists of the impact of this policy, or similar policies, on 
the private insurance coverage of non-disabled individuals.  We use data on insurance 
coverage from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from before and after the 
extension of Medicare to the disabled to estimate the effect of the program on private 
insurance coverage rates in the broader population.  We find that the insurance coverage 
of individuals who had a health condition that limited their ability to work increased 
significantly in states with high versus low rates of SSDI beneficiaries.  These "work-
limited" individuals included, but were not limited to, SSDI beneficiaries.  The increase 
in the number of work-limited individuals with insurance was far greater than the number 
of Medicare eligibles.  Thus, the expansion of Medicare not only increased coverage 
among the targeted population of the disabled, but also among people who were similarly 
situated but less seriously impaired, suggesting the potential usefulness of subsidies to 
high-cost individuals in promoting insurance coverage generally.   
Then, we use data from the Health Insurance Council
1 from 1970-1980 to 
estimate the effect of the extension of Medicare on private insurance comprehensiveness.  
As we discuss below, the same model that predicts that the extension of Medicare could 
have spillover effects also predicts that it could lead to increases in the 
comprehensiveness of coverage.  We find that the comprehensiveness of private health 
insurance increased significantly after versus before the extension of Medicare in states 
with high versus low rates of SSDI beneficiaries.    
Our analysis proceeds in the next five sections.  Section II presents a theoretical 
framework that explains how targeted subsidies for health insurance can have effects in 
                                                 
1 The Health Insurance Council became the Health Insurance Association of America, which later became 
America's Health Insurance Plans.   5
the broader population.  In section III we discuss the data we use for our analysis, 
describe our methodological approach, and present tabular results which show evidence 
of a large impact of the extension of Medicare on non-disabled coverage rates.  We 
embed this analysis in a more general econometric model in Section IV and present 
results.  In section V, we estimate the effect of the extension of Medicare on the scope of 
the policy offerings of private insurers.  Section VI concludes.   
 
II.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The canonical Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model of insurance markets has two key 
predictions:  heterogeneous individuals can not exist in the same insurance plan, and 
high-cost individuals obtain the insurance they most prefer.  In this model, subsidies to 
high-cost individuals have no effect on anyone other than the targeted group.  Yet, in 
practice, the stark predictions of Rothschild-Stiglitz do not occur.  In general, it is high-
cost individuals (not low-cost individuals) who have greater difficulty obtaining their 
desired level of insurance.  This suggests that the canonical model may be a poor tool for 
predicting the consequences of targeted subsidies. 
Joseph Newhouse (1996) shows how extending Rothschild-Stiglitz to include 
contracting costs makes the model more realistic.  In Newhouse's model, fixed costs to 
writing separate types of insurance policies can make it profitable to offer a policy that 
both high- and low-cost individuals will buy.  If these fixed costs are large enough, then it 
will not pay for an insurer to move from a pooling equilibrium to one that segregates the 
two types.    6
The Newhouse model also generates several intuitive comparative static results.  
First, increases in the transaction costs of writing separate contracts or, equivalently, 
decreases in the range of types in the market leads to increases in the extent of pooling.  
Greater pooling, in turn, means lower premiums and higher coverage rates for high-cost 
individuals.  Second, decreases in the range of types in the market increases the 
comprehensiveness of insurance policies that are offered in equilibrium.  Transaction-
cost induced pooling constrains the generosity of plans that can be profitably offered, 
because low-cost individuals prefer less than full insurance; but as the types become 
more similar (holding transaction costs constant) the scope of insurance that will support 
pooling increases.   
Targeted subsidies have the effect of decreasing the effective range of types in the 
market, either by offsetting the expected medical expenses of high-cost individuals or by 
removing such individuals from the market entirely.  Thus, subsidies may have spillover 
effects on those who are untargeted but similar.  In this paper, we test this prediction:  
whether the extension of Medicare to the disabled increased the coverage of nondisabled 
individuals with high expected costs and increased the scope of health insurance offered 
in the market.  To date, no work has provided empirical evidence of such a scheme’s 
incentives.  This paper seeks to fill this gap.  We examine a "natural experiment" from 
the recent past — the extension of Medicare in 1973 to disabled individuals receiving 
SSDI.  This policy had the effect of removing individuals with high expected health costs 
from private health insurance pools.  We estimate the impact of this policy on the 
coverage of both the population at large and a high-cost segment of the population who 
was at risk of becoming, but had not yet necessarily become, disabled — individuals who   7
are limited in the kind or amount of work they can do ("work-limited" individuals).  We 
compare trends in coverage of these individuals before versus after the extension of 
Medicare in states with large versus small SSDI populations.  In so doing, we can assess 
the potential effectiveness of subsidization of high-cost individuals as a policy to improve 
the functioning of private markets.  
 
III.  DATA AND ESTIMATION APPROACH 
A.  Data 
To identify health insurance coverage rates, we use data from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), waves 2-5 and 13 (that is, 1969-1972 and 1980).
2  In each of 
these years, the PSID asked heads of household whether they were "covered by some 
hospital or medical insurance, like Blue Cross" except in 1980, when it asked whether 
they were "covered by some hospital or medical insurance, like Medicare, Blue Cross, or 
Blue Shield."  (The health insurance question was not asked in any year 1973-1979.)  Our 
sample is limited to persons age 64 or less, and we omitted all individuals whose 
response to this question was missing.  In each of these years, the PSID also asked heads 
of household whether they had a "physical or nervous condition that limits the kind or 
amount of work" they could do.   In 1980, 15.7 percent of the population answered yes to 
                                                 
2  The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of U.S. individuals and their families, started 
in 1968.  Data are collected annually, and the data files contain the full span of information collected over 
the course of the study.  The study's original households constitute a national probability sample of U.S. 
households as of 1967. Its rules for following household members were designed to maintain a 
representative sample of families at any point in time as well as across time.   The most detailed 
information is collected each year about the heads of family units.  Around the time that Medicare was 
extended to the disabled, data on health insurance was asked only of heads, and only in 1969, 1970, 1971, 
1972, and 1980. 
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this question (in all years, 16.1 percent answered yes); we classify these individuals as 
"work-limited" in our subsequent analysis. 
Ideally, to measure each state's density of high-cost individuals who would be 
removed from the private insurance market by the extension of Medicare, we would use 
the number of nonelderly SSDI beneficiaries who would be eligible for Medicare per 
nonelderly resident.  However, only the total number of nonelderly SSDI beneficiaries 
per nonelderly resident is available.  Because the latter includes individuals who have 
been on SSDI for less than 29 months (and therefore are not eligible for Medicare), the 
former is a more accurate measure of the differential impact across states of the extension 
of Medicare to the disabled.  However, if anything, our use of an imperfect proxy in this 
context is likely to lead us to understate the effect of interest.  If the number of SSDI 
beneficiaries who would be eligible for Medicare were a proportion of the total that was 
constant across states, then our estimate would understate the true magnitude by the 
inverse of this proportion.  (If the number of SSDI beneficiaries who would be eligible 
for Medicare were a proportion of the total that was random across states, this would 
further bias our estimate towards zero.)  Our stratification of states would only bias us in 
favor of finding an effect if states with expanding private insurance markets also had an 
expanding proportion of SSDI beneficiaries who would be eligible for Medicare.    
We also matched data on the number of nonelderly Medicaid beneficiaries by 
state for the years 1969, 1972, and 1980 (we calculated data for years 1970 and 1971 by 
linear interpolation).  We divided the number of Medicaid beneficiaries by each state's 
nonelderly populaton to get state Medicaid enrollment rates.  We control for Medicaid 
enrollment rates in estimating the effect of the extension of Medicare for two reasons.    9
First, and most important, the survey question underlying our dependent variable is 
ambiguously worded.  Ostensibly, the question was intended to measure private 
insurance coverage, but could be interpreted to include coverage by Medicaid.  Because 
we are seeking to identify the effect of the extension of Medicare on private coverage, not 
private plus Medicaid coverage, we include Medicaid enrollment as a control variable.  
Second, even if the survey question measured only private insurance coverage, the 
endogeneity of state Medicaid policies, combined with Medicaid crowd-out, could lead to 
correlation between the number of SSDI beneficiaries and private insurance coverage.  
This result could occur, for example, if Medicaid enrollment is positively related to a 
state's disability rate, and increases in Medicaid lead to decreases in private insurance 
coverage. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the PSID population that we analyze.  
The first row of the table shows that most nonelderly heads of household are covered by 
insurance and that this share remained roughly constant over our study period.  The 
second row shows that, according to the PSID, roughly 16 percent of the population 
report themselves to be work-limited, and that this share too remained roughly constant 
over the 1970s.   
Table 2 shows how we classify states based on their rates of SSDI receipt.  We 
coded a state as "high disability" if its disability rate in a given year was above the 
population-weighted median; we coded it as "low disability" if its disability rate was 
below the median.  The first row contains the list of states in each study year that have 
above the population-weighted median level of SSDI.  The remaining rows provide the 
median SSDI rate, the 25th - 75th interquartile range of SSDI rates, and the average SSDI   10
rates in high- and low- disability states.  In 1980, for example, the median rate of SSDI 
receipt was 1.37 percent (based on the interquartile range of 1.21, 1.52 percent).  
B.  The Effect of Medicare for the Disabled on Private Insurance Coverage Rates 
Figure 1 presents the basic results of our analysis.  Figure 1 contains four lines, 
each representing the trend in coverage rates over the 1969-80 period for one of four 
types of individuals.  The top line presents coverage for individuals from a low disability-
state who were not work-limited; directly below it is the line for individuals from a high-
disability state who were not work-limited.  Insurance coverage rates follow the pattern 
that the Newhouse model would predict.  When there is partial pooling, areas with a 
disproportionate number of high-cost individuals have lower coverage overall.  The 
bottom two lines present coverage rates for work-limited individuals from low- and high-
disability states, respectively.  Consistent with pooling being only partial, work-limited 
individuals have lower coverage rates overall.  The striking feature of this graph, 
however, is the discontinuity in coverage rates for work-limited individuals from high-
disability states, which rose dramatically by 1980, after the extension of Medicare. 
Table 3 presents these same results in tabular form with standard errors allowing 
for arbitrary correlation of coverage rates across individuals within a state over time.
3  
The top panel of the table presents coverage rates for respondents who were not work-
limited; the bottom panel presents the same data for those who were work-limited.  The 
top panel shows that the insurance coverage rate for heads of household who were not 
work-limited fell by 2.3 percentage points less in high- versus low-disability states, 
although the difference is not statistically significant.  The coverage rate in high-
                                                 
3 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) show that the standard errors of difference-in-difference 
estimators assuming independence of individual observations are, in general, inconsistent.    11
disability states declined by 0.3 percentage points, while the coverage rate in low-
disability states declined by 2.6 percentage points.  The difference in trends in coverage 
between these two types of states is the difference-in-difference (DD) estimator of the 
effect of the expansion of Medicare.   
The bottom panel of the table presents the same coverage rates for respondents 
who were work-limited.  The effect of Medicare's expansion on this population is far 
more dramatic:  The coverage rate in high-disability states rose by 20.2 percentage 
points, from 57.7 to 77.9 percent.  The coverage rate in low-disability states rose also, but 
by only 1.7 percentage points.  For work-limited individuals, then, the DD estimator of 
the effect of the expansion of Medicare is 18.5 percentage points (with a 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error allowing for within-state correlation of 
residuals of 4.5 percentage points).   
The final rows of the table present the difference between these two DD estimates 
— that is, the difference in trends in coverage for work-limited versus not work-limited 
individuals in high- versus low-disability states.  This difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) estimator of the effect of Medicare is 16.2 percentage points (with a 
standard error of 3.6 percentage points).  The DDD estimator is more conservative than 
the DD estimator on the work-limited population.  The DDD estimate assumes that the 
difference in trend coverage between high- and low-disability states for not work-limited 
individuals was not due to the change in Medicare coverage policy.   
The DDD estimate of the increase in coverage due to the extension of Medicare is 
much larger than number of people actually covered by the program itself.  In 1980, the 
average SSDI rate (population weighted according to the PSID) in high-disability states   12
was 1.7 percentage points, as compared to an average in low-disability states of 1.2 
percentage points (not in any table).  According to the simple DDD estimate, then, the 0.5 
percentage point of additional coverage offered by Medicare's expansion led to a total of 
2.5 percentage points of additional insurance coverage (0.025 = 0.162 percentage point 
increase in coverage*0.157 of population that was work-limited in 1980).  In other words, 
the extension of Medicare to the disabled led to 2 percentage points (0.02 = 0.025 - 
0.005) of additional private insurance coverage.   
These simple estimates, however, do not account for time-varying differences 
across states that may be correlated with differences in disability and private insurance 
coverage rates.  For example, state Medicaid enrollment rates may have changed across 
states during this period due to changes in state-specific eligibility rules or other 
Medicaid policies.  Alternatively, the differential increase in coverage of the work-
limited in high-disability states could be due to differences in trends in macroeconomic 
factors at the state or regional level.  Finally, the observed coverage effects could be due 
to changes in the composition of individuals or jobs, or the labor- or insurance-market 
opportunities of particular types of individuals, in high- versus low-disability states.   
 
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS 
A.  Models 
To explore these possibilities, we specify a model of insurance coverage.  We 
analyze individual heads of household i = 1,…, N in states j = 1,…, 50 for the years t = 
1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980.  An individual has characteristics Xijt that include age, 
gender, race, veteran status, family size, family income, education, occupation, whether   13
self-employed, and whether out of the labor force.  We define age as a series of indicator 
variables denoting whether the individual is age 25-34, age 35-44, age 45-54, or age 55-
64 (age 15-24 is the omitted group).  We define family income as two indicator variables, 
one for families with incomes between $8,000 and $24,999 (in 1980 dollars), and one for 
families with incomes greater than $24,999 (income less than $8,000 is omitted group).  
We define educational attainment as a series of indicator variables denoting whether the 
individual is high-school-educated, has some college education, or is a college graduate 
(less-than high school education is the omitted group); occupation is an indicator variable 
for whether the policyholder is a professional or technical worker (all other occupations 
are the omitted group).  We use the variable Wijt to capture whether an individual is work-
limited. 
Our models specify insurance coverage, Cijt, as a function of state fixed effects, αj,  
and time fixed effects, θt ; state Medicaid enrollment rates and average income, Mjt; the 
characteristics of individuals, Xijt and Wijt; a variable capturing the state's SSDI 
enrollment rate, Djt; interactions between Djt, Wijt, and an indicator for 1980 (the only 
study period after the extension of Medicare); and an individual-specific error term εijt:   
Cijt = αj + θt + δMjt + Xijtβ + Wijtγ + π1Djt + π2(Djt * Wijt)+ 
 
π3(Wijt * It(t=1980)) + π4(Djt * It(t=1980)) + π5(Djt * Wijt * It(t=1980)) + εijt.  (1) 
 
The coefficient π5
 is the DDD effect of the extension of Medicare— that is, the 
differential trend in coverage in high- versus low-disability states, for work-limited 
individuals relative to those who are not work-limited.   
B.  Results   14
Table 4 reports estimates of π, γ, and δ from equation (1).  The results show that 
the simple DD and DDD estimators from Table 3 present an accurate portrait of the effect 
of the expansion of Medicare.  Results in column (2) show that moving from a low- to a 
high-disability state leads to a 13.3 percentage point increase in the coverage of work-
limited versus not work-limited individuals (with a standard error of 3.6 percentage 
points), controlling for state and year fixed effects, the state's Medicaid coverage rate and 
average income, and a variety of individual characteristics.  Comparing column (1) to 
column (2) shows that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of individual 
characteristics Xijt.  We also re-estimated models (1) and (2) without controls for state 
Medicaid enrollment rates; this did not change the results at all.   
The results in column (4) show that the estimated effect declines in a linear 
specification, but it remains economically and statistically significant.  According to that 
model, an increase in the state SSDI rate of 0.5 percentage-point leads to a 7.8 
(=0.5*15.7) percentage point increase in the coverage of work-limited versus not work-
limited individuals (standard error 3 percentage points).  By comparison, the results in 
column (2) suggest that an increase in the state SSDI rate of 0.5 percentage points from 
1.2 to 1.7 percentage points leads to a 13.3 percentage point increase in the trend in 
relative coverage rates. 
C.  Validity checks 
To investigate the validity of these results, we reestimate equation (1) on four 
different subsamples.  Simply controlling for individuals' background characteristics, 
state- and time-fixed effects, and state average income and Medicaid enrollment may not 
eliminate the influence of omitted factors on the DDD estimate of the effect of the   15
extension of Medicare.  This could be true if the level of development of high-disability 
states changed in a way that was not fully captured by average income.  It could also be 
true if the insurance coverage of individuals with a particular characteristic changed 
across states and over time due to some factor other than the extension of Medicare.  
African-Americans (due to the expanded enforcement of civil rights laws) or veterans 
(due to the changes in policy or practice after the Vietnam war), for example, may have 
been disproportionately represented in high-disability states and enjoyed expanded access 
to jobs or insurance over this period for reasons having nothing to do with Medicare.  
Finally, it could be true if the characteristics of heads of household in 1980 changed in 
some other, unobservable way from the characteristics in 1969-72 in a way that was 
correlated with insurance coverage and state disability rates. 
Table 5 presents results from these analyses.  Each column of the Table re-
estimates the model underlying column (2), Table 4, on a differently-restricted 
subsample.  The first column of the Table omits all residents of Southern states (using the 
Census bureau's definition of the South:  DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, 
KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, and TX).  The point estimate of the effect of interest rises 
(although is certainly within two standard deviations of the effect in column (2), Table 4).  
Column (2) omits African-Americans, and column (3) omits veterans.  The magnitude of 
the effect of interest declines slightly in these specifications, but is still statistically 
significant and indistinguishable from the effect on the full sample.  Column (4) takes 
advantage of the panel nature of the PSID and restricts the sample to only those 
individuals who were head of a respondent household in 1980 and at least one of the 
years before the extension of Medicare (1969-72).  Estimates from this sample hardly   16
change at all, indicating that changes in unobserved differences across individuals is 
unlikely to be driving the results.  
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V.  THE EFFECTS OF THE EXTENSION OF MEDICARE ON THE 
COMPREHENSIVENESS OF COVERAGE 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that our results could be generated by an 
unobserved process that is correlated with both changes in private insurance coverage 
rates and changes in disability rates across states.  To further investigate this concern, we 
test whether differences in trends in disability rates across states affect the 
comprehensiveness of private insurance, as economic theory suggests that it should.  If 
the extension of Medicare to the disabled increased private insurance coverage rates by 
increasing the extent of pooling, then it should have increased the scope of coverage as 
well.   
To investigate whether this was so, we use data from the Health Insurance 
Council from 1970-1980.  We construct a measure of the comprehensiveness of coverage 
in state j at year t, Qjt, equal to the number of people with coverage for hospital and 
general medical expenses divided by the number who were reported to have had coverage 
for hospital expenses.  Early health insurance policies offered only coverage for hospital 
stays, but over the 1970s, policies began to include a wider range of services.  We specify 
Qjt as a function of state fixed effects, αj,  and time fixed effects, θt ; state Medicaid 
enrollment rates, Mjt; hospital insurance coverage rates Cjt; a variable capturing the state's 
SSDI enrollment rate, Djt; interactions between Djt  and indicator variable(s) for periods 
after the extension of Medicare; and a state-year error term εjt: 
Qjt = αj + θt + δMjt + βCjt + π1Djt +π2(Djt * It(t ≥ 1973)) +  εjt.    (2a) 
and 
 
Qjt = αj + θt + δMjt + βCjt + π1Djt +   18
π2(Djt * It(1975 ≥ t ≥ 1973)) +  π3(Djt * It(t ≥ 1976)) +  εjt.    (2b) 
and 
Qjt = αj + θt + δMjt + βCjt + π1Djt +π2(Djt * It(t ≥ 1976)) +  εjt.    (2c) 
Each of these specifications makes a slightly different assumption about the 
timing of the effect of interest.  Model (2a) assumes that private insurance markets 
responded immediately to Medicare's coverage of the disabled.  Models (2b) and (2c) 
assume that markets responded with a lag.  Model (2b) estimates both the short-run and 
long-run effects, whereas model (2c) constrains the short-run effect to be zero. 
Table 6 presents estimates from these models.  The table shows that the 
comprehensiveness of private coverage expanded more in response to Medicare in states 
that had large disabled populations than in states that did not.  Depending on 
specification, the share of hospital insurance policies that also provided medical expense 
coverage grew between 2.5 and 4.4 percentage points more in high-disability states.  
Descriptive statistics not presented in any table show that this effect was due to 
comprehensiveness starting lower in high-disability states, but catching up coincident 
with the extension of Medicare.   In 1970, the proportion of hospital insurance policies 
that provided medical expense coverage was 75.9 percent in high-disability states and 
84.7 percent in low-disability states.  In 1973, the proportions were 82.5 and 86.5 
percent; by 1980, the proportions had become almost identical, at 89.5 and 90.6 percent.   
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Using an important policy natural experiment, we have estimated the extent to 
which subsidies to cover high-cost individuals affect insurance coverage of others.  
According to our point estimates, extension of Medicare to an additional 0.5 percent of 
the population through the Social Security Disability Insurance program led to an 
increase in private insurance coverage of between 7.8 and 13.3 percentage points among 
individuals who described themselves as limited in the kind or amount of work that they 
can do.  In 1980, these work-limited individuals were 15.7 percent of the total population.  
Thus, extending Medicare to an additional 0.5 percentage points of the population 
increased total insurance coverage by 1.2 (= 0.157 * 7.8) to 2.1 (=0.157 * 13.3) 
percentage points.  Subtracting off the 0.5 points due to the direct effect of the program 
gives a range for the spillover effect of 0.7 ( = 1.2 - 0.5) to 1.6 (= 2.1 - 0.5) percentage 
points.   
Our results can be used to calculate the marginal "target efficiency" of extending 
Medicare to the disabled in the 1970s.  Gruber (2003), for example, suggests evaluating 
such programs in terms of a “bang for the buck” — the total government spending per 
dollar of insurance cost covered (that is, the cost per newly insured weighted by the cost 
of those who are gaining insurance).  Medicaid expansions to low-income adults, 
according to Gruber, have a budget cost of $1.30 per dollar of previously uncovered 
health costs.  The budget cost exceeds $1.00 because of crowding-out of private 
coverage; for every $1.00 the government spends to newly insure someone with 
Medicaid, it must also give insurance to some number of individuals who would have had 
private coverage.     20
Using the midpoint of our range of estimates of the extent of crowding-in of the 
non-disabled population of 1.15 percentage points (1.15 = ((0.7 + 1.6) / 2)) per 0.5 
percentage points of Medicare expansion, the formula for the target efficiency of the 
program is: 
[0.5cd] / [1.15cn + (1 - λ)*0.5cd], 
where λ is the extent of crowding-out of private insurance by Medicare; cd is the cost of 
public insurance for a newly covered disabled person; and cn is the cost of private 
insurance for a newly covered non-disabled person. 
As the formula shows, one cannot calculate the target efficiency of the policy 
without information on extent of crowding-out of the program, the health spending of the 
newly covered disabled individuals, and the health spending of the newly covered non-
disabled individuals.  However, it is possible to calculate the conditions under which it is 
more target-efficient than a typical Medicaid expansion,
4 or under which it achieves a 
target efficiency of less than one dollar per dollar of previously uncovered health costs  -- 
that is, no target efficiency cost.  For example, assuming complete crowding-out of 
private insurance coverage (λ = 1) for the disabled, the target efficiency of the program 
reduces to 0.5cd / 1.15cn .  Thus, even with 100 percent crowd-out, the program is still 
more target-efficient than a typical Medicaid expansion, as long as 0.5cd / 1.15cn  < 1.3, 
or (cn/cd) > 0.33; the program has no target efficiency cost at all as long as 0.5cd / 1.15cn  
< 1,  or (cn/cd) > 0.43.  In 2003, Medicare reimbursed $6,471 per disabled enrollee in the 
program, while the annual premium for a conventional, single-person employer-
                                                 
4 In principle, the coefficient from Table 4 on the number of Medicaid beneficiaries in a state could be used 
to assess the extent of Medicaid crowd-out.  However, because states with low rates of private insurance 
coverage may (endogenously) expand their Medicaid programs, we instead use estimates of the target 
efficiency of Medicaid from other research.   21
sponsored insurance policy was $3,576 (Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health 
Benefits 2003 Survey), yielding an estimate of (cn/cd) of 0.553.  Hence, at recent values of 
cn  and cd, the program is highly target-efficient. 
The extent to which our estimates of the effects of the extension of Medicare can 
be extrapolated to future targeted subsidies remains an open question.  Although our 
point estimates are quite large, several factors suggest caution in applying them out-of-
sample.  First, our estimates are measured with considerable error:  the lower 95% 
confidence bound in most specifications is approximately half the size of the point 
estimate.  In addition, the extension of Medicare to the disabled arguably removed the 
most seriously chronically ill from the private insurance pool, and removed them 
completely; the people who would be covered by most proposed policies are likely to be 
less costly over the long run than SSDI recipients, and are likely to be subsidized less 
than fully.  Future work might seek to account for these differences and use these 
estimates to simulate the effects of programs that are similar but not identical to the 
extension of Social Security to the disabled.     22
Figure 1: Trends in insurance coverage rates in high- versus low-disability states, 
respondents with and without a work limitation, heads of household 
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Table 1:  Variables used in analysis, Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
Heads of household, Means and (standard deviations) 
 
  1969-1972  1980 
     
Covered by insurance  0.832  0.840 
     
Has condition limiting kind or amount of work  0.163  0.157 
     
Family income $8,000 - $24,999 (1980$)  0.511  0.486 
     
Family income > $24,999 (1980$)  0.363  0.360 
     
Professional/technical occupation  0.236  0.273 
     
Self-employed  0.050  0.018 
     
Not in labor force  0.117  0.152 
     
High-school education  0.311  0.364 
     
Some college  0.158  0.181 
     
College or postgraduate degree  0.144  0.195 
     
Female  0.204  0.244 
     
Black  0.112  0.126 
     
Veteran  0.391  0.311 
     




     




     




     




     
N  16,747  5,655 
 
Notes:  Reported statistics are calculated using PSID population weights.   24
Table 2:  States with high (above-median) disability rates  
 
  1969  1970  1971  1972  1980 
           
  AL AR AZ 
CA FL GA 
KY LA ME 
MO MS NC 
OK OR PA 
SC TN VA 
WV  
AL AR AZ 
CA DC FL 
GA KY LA 
ME MO MS 
NC NY OK 
OR PA SC 
TN VA WV 
AL AR AZ 
CA DC FL 
GA KY LA 
ME MO MS 
NC NM OK 
OR PA SC 
TN VA VT 
WV 
AL AR AZ 
CA DC FL 
GA KY LA 
ME MO MS 
NC NM OK 
OR PA SC 
TN VA VT 
WV 
AL AR AZ 
DE FL GA 
KY LA ME 
MO MS NC 
NY OH OK 
PA RI SC 
TN VA WV 

















































































           
           
Note:  Rates are calculated using PSID population weights.  Source:  Social Security 
Bulletin, Table Q-14, June 1970, December 1970-73, December 1981-82.   25
Table 3:  Average insurance coverage rates in high- versus low-disability states, 
respondents with and without a work limitation, heads of household 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1969-1972 and 1980 
 
 






























Respondents who are not work-limited     
                 
0.839  0.836  -0.003    0.897  0.871  -0.026    0.023 
    (0.015)         (0.018)    (0.027) 
                 
 
Respondents who are work-limited 
         
0.577  0.779  0.202    0.731  0.748  0.017    0.185 
     (0.025)        (0.033)    (0.045) 
                 
DDD effect of Medicare Extension 
Difference in work-limited versus not work-limited 
After-Before extension, high-low disability states 
  0.162 
(0.036) 
                       
       
 
Note:  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors allowing for within-state correlation 
are in parentheses.  Estimates are calculated using PSID sample weights.  N = 22,402, 
and the number of states (and number of clusters) is 50.     26
Table 4:  The effect on insurance coverage rates of extending Medicare to the disabled, 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1969-72 and 1980 
Effect of Medicare extension
Work-limited* 0.164 *** 0.133 ***
   high-disability state*1980 (0.037) (0.036)
Work-limited* 22.377 *** 15.697 ***
   state disability rate*1980 (7.197) (6.007)
Lower-level interaction terms
High-disability state*1980 -0.018 -0.017
(0.024) (0.023)
High-disability state*work-limited -0.089 *** -0.050 **
(0.029) (0.022)
High-disability state 0.000 0.015
(0.020) (0.020)
State disability rate*1980 -1.377 -6.015
(5.106) (5.391)
State disability rate*work-limited -17.849 *** -9.282 **
(5.415) (3.690)
State disability rate -4.649 10.775
(8.054) (10.194)
Work-limited*1980 0.044 0.080 *** -0.089 -0.022
(0.031) (0.028) (0.098) (0.087)
Work-limited -0.165 *** -0.057 *** -0.059 -0.003
(0.025) (0.016) (0.053) (0.035)
State Medicaid/pop rate -0.509 *** -0.262 * -0.493 *** -0.269 *
(0.154) (0.156) (0.139) (0.152)
In regression but State, year FE State, year FE State, year FE State, year FE
   not reported in table Individual controls Individual controls
State average income State average income
Dependent variable= 1 if has insurance coverage
(1) (4) (3) (2)
 
Note:  Individual controls include age 25-34, age 35-44, age 45-54, age 55-64 (omitted 
group is age 18-24); family income $8,000-$24,999, family income > $24,000 (omitted 
group is family income < $8,000); high-school education, some college, college or more 
(omitted group is less than high school); professional/technical occupation; self-
employment status; out of the labor force status; Black (race); female; veteran status; and 
family size. Also see note to Table 3.     27
Table 5:  The effect on insurance coverage rates of extending Medicare to the disabled, 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1969-72 and 1980, alternative samples 
 
Effect of Medicare extension
Work-limited* 0.196 *** 0.123 *** 0.109 * 0.131 ***
   high-disability state*1980 (0.040) (0.042) (0.057) (0.043)
Lower-level interaction terms
High-disability state*1980 -0.017 -0.020 -0.025 -0.023
(0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.018)
High-disability state*work-limited -0.063 ** -0.052 ** -0.055 * -0.066 ***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025)
High-disability state 0.018 0.019 0.007 0.028 *
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
Work-limited*1980 0.083 *** 0.082 *** 0.083 * 0.091 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.043) (0.031)
Work-limited -0.052 *** -0.049 *** -0.057 ** -0.039 **
(0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018)
State Medicaid/pop rate -0.204 -0.260 * -0.095 -0.320 **
(0.152) (0.152) (0.220) (0.141)
Sample Except residents Except  Except Individuals in 
of Southern states Blacks  Veterans panel in 1980
and at least one
year, 1969-72
N 12,931 13,999 15,527 14,706
Dependent variable= 1 if has insurance coverage
(1) (4) (3) (2)
 
Note:  In regression but not reported in table are state- and year-fixed-effects; all 
individual controls in table 4; and state average income.  Also see note to Table 3.     28
Table 6:  The effect on the comprehensiveness of health insurance of extending Medicare 
to the disabled, 1970-1980 
 
Proportion of those with hospital insurance who have medical expense coverage
Effect of Medicare extension
High-disability state* 0.035 * 0.013
   1973 or later (0.020) (0.023)
High-disability state* 0.022 -0.004
   1973-1975 (0.017) (0.023)
High-disability state* 0.044 * 0.032 * 0.025 0.028 *
   1976 or later (0.024) (0.017) (0.025) (0.016)
Lower-level interaction terms
High-disability state -0.017 -0.018 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
Population weights? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Note:  Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors allowing for within-state correlation 
are in parentheses.  All estimates control for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, State 
Medicaid/pop rate, and state hospital insurance rate.   N = 561, and the number of states 
(and number of clusters) is 51 (includes DC).     29
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